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Abstract
In The Grammar of Autobiography, Jean Quigley makes a claim that one often hears nowadays - that the
self is constructed in autobiographical narrative discourse. Two things distinguish her analysis of
narrative self-construction from many other treatments of the subject. First, she offers a genuinely
interdisciplinary account, drawing on functional linguistics, theoretical and developmental psychology,
and accounts of language development. Second, she studies a particular category of linguistic forms,
modals, as the key to narrative self-construction.
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In The grammarof autobiography,Jean Quigley makes a claim that one often
hears nowadays: that the self is constructed in autobiographicalnarrativediscourse. Two dimensions of the work distinguish her analysis of narrativeselfconstructionfrommanyothertreatmentsof the subject.First,she offersa genuinely
interdisciplinaryaccount, drawing on functional linguistics, theoretical and developmental psychology, and accounts of language development. Second, she
studies a particularcategoryof linguistic forms - modals- as the key to narrative
self-construction.
Quigley focuses on what Labov & Waletsky 1967 call the "evaluation"narratorsdo in telling autobiographicalstories.A coherentnarrativehas a point, and
this point often positions the narratorin some socio-ideological space. Quigley
argues, convincingly, that autobiographicalnarratorsuse subtle linguistic cues
like modals to position themselves with respect to salient others, or with respect
to controversialissues in their social worlds. This positioning creates the narrator's self, she claims, because selves are the kinds of things that are created "on
line" in social interaction.
This account already draws on both linguistics - grammaticaland discourse
analyses of modals - and on psychology, for theories about the self. Quigley
integratesone moreperspectiveinto her account,exploringhow childrendevelop
narrativecompetenceandhow this developing ability to tell storiesmight interact
with their developing selves. Instead of analyzing how particularinstances of
narrativediscourse might partly construct a particularnarrator'sself, Quigley
analyzes how children's use of modals develops, and how these developing linguistic resourcesmight facilitate the narrativeconstructionof self. This addition
of developmentalpsychology to her accountof narrativeself-constructionmakes
Quigley's approachrelatively unusual.
Any linguistically sophisticated account of narrativeself-construction must
describehow linguistic tokens influence or constitutepsychological entities. The
first step is to describe how speech creates patternsthat can then influence the
self. Quigley rightly emphasizes the creative power of speech, but she does not
define precisely what it is that speech creates. She claims that speech "actually
brings about certain types of discourse and contexts" (p. ix), but she does not
develop an account of the many aspects of "discourse"and "contexts."Sometimes she claims that "information"is the crucial productof speech: Narrators
presuppose informationabout their beliefs and attitudes,and such presupposed
informationplays the critical role in narrativeself-construction.At other times,
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she claims that narratorsaccomplish speech acts and that such verbal actions do
the essential work of self-construction.
As Quigley herself says, both presupposed information and verbal action
undoubtedly play some role in narrative self-construction. But a full account
will have to specify more precisely how the various functions of narrativediscourse (denotational,conative, interactional,textual, etc.) create cognitive, interpersonal, or some other sorts of patterns that can then influence the self.
Quigley considers, but does not clearly choose among, various possibilities.
She claims that grammatical categories create possible worlds for speakers.
This Whorfian idea has been elaborated systematically by Lucy 1992, and it
offers one possibility for how language might create a pattern that could influence the self. Quigley also claims that a narrator"emplots himself or herself
in an autobiographicalstoryline" (15). Labov & Waletsky 1967, among others,
describe how linguistic devices create plots, and this offers another possible
linguistic mechanism for narrative self-construction. Quigley proposes that
narrators can position themselves with respect to their characters and the
social voices that these charactersrepresent.Hill 1995 and others use Bakhtin
to describe systematically how narratorsspeak with and ventriloquate voices,
and this offers yet another type of linguistic device that might contribute to
the self.
Quigley would probablyargue that all these linguistic devices can contribute
to narrativeself-construction,and I would agree. But she too often claims simply
that "modals"do the essential work, without specifying which type of linguistic
mechanism she is talking about - modals, after all, constitute grammaticalcategories, contributeto representationsof plots, voice and ventriloquatecharacters,
and more. A more compelling account will have to describe in detail how particular aspects of language work together to create patterns that contribute to
the self.
Describing the relevant linguistic mechanisms is only the first step in an account of narrativeself-construction.Whatevercognitive or interpersonalpattern
gets createdthroughnarrativediscourse must then influence the self. Any theory
of narrativeself-constructionalso presupposes an account of what "the self" is
and how it can be influenced. Quigley does address this issue. She draws on
social constructionistaccounts of self (e.g., Harre 1995), claiming that the self is
a "workingconcept" that is constructed"on line" while speaking. I agree with
Quigley that a broadly constructionistapproachto the self can support her account of narrativeself-construction,but her theoreticaldiscussions are quick and
sometimes puzzling. Does she really mean that the self has no enduringaspects,
but is created anew in each interaction?Is our sense of self-coherence merely an
illusion? One could argueon both sides of these questions, but Quigley does not
articulateany clear position. At times, she seems to be a radical constructionist
(unlike Harre 1995), denying any metaphysical status to the psychological self
beyond what gets projected from discourse in particularinteractions.At other
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times, she seems to supportmore traditionalpsychological theories of the self,
like that of Damon & Hart 1988, who posit seven universal domains of the self
and four universal developmentalstages for each domain.
Quigley's data are a corpus of autobiographicalstories, promptedby and told
to an interviewer,narratedby 36 children aged 5, 8, or 12. The cross-sectional
design yields some interestingfindings. For example, the 5-year-olds use all the
basic forms and functions that Quigley finds central to self-constructionin narrative - though with varying frequency - so there seems not to be a qualitative
developmental leap in the narrativeconstructionof self. Youngernarratorsalso
tend more consistently to use one form or class of modals for a particulararea of
meaning (e.g., obligationor ability), while 12-year-oldshave masteredthe multifunctionalityof particularforms.And, despite the stereotypicalview of autobiography as concerned with the past, about one-thirdof the narrativeutterancesin
this sample describe the future.
Such findings must be interpreteda bit skeptically,however, because of methodological concerns. Quigley does not provide any statistical significance tests
for her quantitativeconclusions. She simply gives percentages for each of the
three age groups, then moves rightto interpretingthe differences. In many cases,
the differences areclearly significant,but significance can be hardto gauge without calculating.In anotherpuzzling methodologicalomission, Quigley calculates
the mean numberof modals per child (9.8 for 5-year-olds, 13.3. for 8-year-olds,
and 18.7 for 12-year-olds).Then she gives an importantqualification: 12-yearolds may not in fact use more modals, because they may simply have talked
longer. But then she refuses to calculate the frequency of modals per minute or
per utterance,saying this is "neithernecessary nor desirable"(62). Although it's
of course not necessary, it would have allowed the readerto see whether older
children do in fact use more modals.
Furthermethodological questions arise from Quigley's coding system. Some
of her categories are illuminating and not controversial. She counts, for example, the person and numberof the subjects used with modalized predicates, the
frequency of reported speech, the transitivity of the main verbs. But she also
creates some categories herself, without clear theoreticalrationale,like the "discourse goals" of the modalized utterances.There are eight such goals, including problem-solving,reporting,prescribing,"interpersonalnarratingfunctions,"
making theory-of-mind statements, and referringto unreal states. These eight
are subdivided further,so that interpersonalnarratingfunctions include apologizing, dismissing, boasting, dramatizing,accusing, blaming, and so on. Such
coding schemes notoriously depend on the native language and social position
of the categorizer,as shown in the lists of English verbs created by speech act
theory.There is also the problemof overlapbetween these particularcategories.
These variousmethodologicalconcernsmightlead a readerto agreewith Quigley's claim that "the case made in this book is primarilytheoretical ratherthan
empirical"(109). Her central theoretical point - that narratorspartly construct
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themselves throughsystematic linguistic patternsin autobiography- is in fact a
convincing one, but we need more empirical and theoretical work to realize the
promise of her approach.
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Well known for its creation and adoption of modem Hebrew as its national language, Israel is still one of the most linguistically heterogeneous societies in the
world. BernardSpolsky and Elana Shohamy delve into this complex reality and
describe a coherent picture of it, drawing from an updated model of linguistic
policy which they elaborate.I found no few weaknesses in the book in regardto
the sociological interpretationof sociolinguistic facts, but its major interest resides in the descriptionof Israel's linguistic diversity and evolution. It is one of
the very few attemptsto date to do that, and it merits attention.
Following the revival of Hebrew and its adjustmentto the modem era during
the first decades of the 20th century,Israel's goal in linguistic policy since the
creation of the state in 1948 was to ensure the acquisition of the language by
Israelis - as a first language by the Jewish majority,and as a second language by
the Arab minority.This effort has been successful. It has established Hebrew not
only as a language capable of being used for the widest range of functions, but
also as one that is effectively so used by the large majorityof Israelis. This is the
language that dominates public space, culturallife, politics, the arts - and especially literature.It is also the language most used in private, in the family and
among friends. Moreover,what is true for the majorityof the adult populationis
even more so for the young. Even Israel'sArabpopulation,for whom Arabic is a
first language, are bilingual in large part. Furthermore,whereas Hebrew was a
markerof Jews in this country in earlier decades, opposing them to Diaspora
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